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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of Indonesia’s tax reforms of 2000 and 
2008/2009 on taxpayers’ noncompliance. Noncompliance is defined as the difference between the 
Value Added Tax (VAT) liability and the actual revenue. Data are mainly collected from the World 
Input-Output Database and Indonesia’s Central Board of Statistics. The methodology uses one of the 
‘top-down’ approaches, in which national accounts figures are employed to arrive at an estimation of 
the VAT liability. It is found that compliance deteriorated when reform efforts were incomplete – that 
is when the reforms suffered from decelerations, setbacks or reversals. This paper contributes to the 
literature by providing a framework for analyzing the impact of tax reform on taxpayer’s compliance 
behavior. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tax noncompliance is present in all economies 
using taxes to finance government expenditures 
(Eichhorn, 2004; Freire-Serén & i Martí, 2013). 
For Indonesia, tax noncompliance has 
challenged the recent governments’ ambitious 
economic development projects, particularly 
those for enhancing infrastructure and expanding 
the social safety net, which require significant 
increases in public revenues.  
The tax gap – which is the difference 
between the actual collection and its potential – 
may rise due to government policy and taxpayer 
noncompliance. A policy gap occurs from 
deliberate government policies that provide 
incentives and facilities in taxation, such as 
reduced rates and exemptions. The compliance 
gap arises from taxpayers’ nonconformity with 
the tax laws, either legally through tax avoidance 
measures, or illegally through tax evasion. It 
may be important to analyze both gaps 
separately. This paper only discusses the 
compliance gap, however, because in the context 
of Indonesia this estimation is crucial for 
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The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own 
and do not reflect the view of the organization with which 
the author affiliated. 
assessing the results of two tax reform programs 
(which were launched after the Asian financial 
crisis of 1998) on taxpayers’ compliance 
behavior. 
Nevertheless, time series research on 
Indonesia’s tax noncompliance is rare, thus its 
trend over time has rarely been examined. 
Ikhsan, Trialdi, and Syahrial (2005) estimated 
the Indonesian tax gap using national survey 
data from 2003 and found that collection only 
covers 43 percent of the potential for personal 
income taxes and around 50 percent for VAT. 
Still, their study only examines the tax gap at a 
point in time, the year 2003. Hence, a more 
complete picture of the trend of noncompliance 
over time may be needed to examine whether it 
has been improving or deteriorating, assess its 
proximate causes and formulate appropriate 
policies. 
In this paper, the estimation of the Value 
Added Tax (VAT) gap is chosen as the 
benchmark for analyzing noncompliance, 
because nonconformity with this type of tax is 
likely to be followed by noncompliance with 
income tax. The invoice-and-credit design of 
VAT should make nonconformity easier to 
detect than in other types of taxation, at least 
theoretically. Hence, when taxpayers fail to 
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report or under report their VAT liabilities, it is 
likely that they would also fail to report or under 
report their income tax liabilities, in order to 
avoid detection. 
The rest of this paper is organized as 
follows. The second section overviews the 
introduction of VAT in Indonesia and its 
collection performance to date. The third section 
discusses the problems with VAT compliance, 
including how its invoice-and-credit design 
could be fraudulently exploited. The fourth 
section explains the methodology and data 
employed to arrive at the estimations of the VAT 
gap. The fifth section presents the results and 
discusses how incomplete reforms might 
contribute to increases in the VAT gap. Section 
six presents the concluding remarks. 
VAT IN INDONESIA 
In 1984, Indonesia enacted a major tax reform, 
which represented a significant departure from 
the tax system adopted since the country’s 
independence. At the time of the reform, there 
were acknowledged defects in the existing tax 
structure and tax administration. Many of these 
defects could be attributed to the generally 
unsuccessful policies to fine-tune the tax system 
to support nonrevenue objectives, such as 
industrial growth, regional development and 
income redistribution (Gillis, 1989). 
One of the centerpieces of the reform was 
the introduction of VAT to replace an outdated 
sales tax which was riddled with exemptions and 
used complex, multiple rates. Indonesia’s VAT 
is broadly due on events involving the delivery 
of taxable goods or services. A single rate of 10 
percent applies on domestic sales and imports 
while exports are subject to zero-rating. A legal 
negative list sets out which goods and services 
were exempted from the tax. This list includes 
basic commodities (such as rice, corn and soy), 
mining products and meritorious services (such 
as education, health and cultural services). 
Moreover, some goods which are considered 
‘luxury’ are subject to a luxury sales tax. This 
tax generates an insignificant tax revenue, 
however, and was introduced mainly to protect 
the integrity of the uniform VAT rate and 
improve the political acceptability of the 1984 
tax reform package (Gillis, 1989). 
Nevertheless, even after more than three 
decades of reform the narrow tax base still 
serves as a challenge in the effort to collect 
taxes. Figure 1 shows Indonesia’s tax revenues, 
as a percentage of GDP, compared with its 
neighboring countries, as of 2014. Only 
Malaysia collected less tax on goods and 
services (although much more income tax 
revenue) than Indonesia. While Korea, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore collected tax on goods 
and services, on average, at 5.4 percent of GDP, 
Indonesia only managed to collect 3.9 percent of 
GDP. Overall, Indonesia’s total tax revenue, as a 
percentage of GDP, is the lowest among these 
countries. The country’s minister of finance once 
stated that out of a population of 250 million, 
only 27 million registered as individual 
taxpayers and only 900 thousand individuals, or 
3 percent of those registered, actually pay taxes 
(Utami, 2016). 
When properly administered, VAT may have 
more revenue potential than other alternative 
indirect taxes: it could help improve tax 
compliance and enforcement, due to the trail of 
invoices the system creates, it is generally more 
broad based and could minimise the cascading 
effect of taxation (Le, 2003). Nevertheless, one 
of the possible causes for the limited gains in 
VAT may come from the taxpayers’ 
noncompliance with the tax laws. Results from 
empirical studies show positive associations 
between the level of development of a country 
and its VAT performance. Countries with a 
lower level of per capita income, a higher share 
of the agriculture sector in GDP and a lower 
level of literacy tend to have a lower level of 
VAT collection (Ebrill, Keen, Bodin, & 
Summers, 2001). 
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Figure 1. Tax revenues as percentage of GDP, 2014 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (Various Years); World Economic Outlook (2016). 
VAT NONCOMPLIANCE 
In this paper, VAT noncompliance is defined as 
the gap or the difference between the potential 
and actual yields of the tax, due to taxpayers’ 
noncompliance. This gap should be 
distinguished from the policy gap which refers to 
the impact on the potential yield of the tax, due 
to government policies such as exemptions, 
zero-ratings and other reductions to the potential 
tax base (Hutton, Thackray, & Wingender, 
2014). 
Although tax noncompliance is not confined 
to VAT, its advocates argue that the invoice-
and-credit design of VAT should make this 
practice easy to detect by the authorities, since it 
entails a trail of invoices (Agha & Haughton, 
1996; Barbone et al., 2013; Kopczuk & Slemrod, 
2006). Further, VAT is levied on the sale of 
goods and services at each stage of the 
production chain, as well as the distribution 
chains and the tax paid will be refundable only 
to registered businesses. Theoretically, this 
design provides an incentive for businesses to 
register themselves with the tax authority, since 
non-registered, tax-evading businesses would 
still be liable for the VAT on their purchase of 
inputs, but without the right to recover the 
input’s tax. With this mechanism, proponents of 
VAT describe the tax as ‘self-enforcing’ since 
taxable businesses have strong incentives to 
keep invoices of their transactions, thus the 
paper trails may provide an efficient means for 
tax authorities to audit for enforcement purposes 
(Le, 2003). 
In practice, however, there are many ways in 
which VAT can be evaded or fraudulently 
exploited. The listing that follows is from Smith 
and Keen (2007) and is not intended to be 
complete: 
 Under-reported sales. A taxable business may 
report only a certain proportion of sales or 
treat some sales as completely ‘off the 
books’. It may or may not issue invoices for 
its sales, particularly for sales to final 
consumers, since no credit would be available 
for these consumers. Common examples of 
this group are personal services such as 
hairdressing and home decorating In these 
types of activities, however, the value added 
at the final stage is usually large, relative to 
the input VAT. 
 Failure to register. Many VAT regimes oblige 
taxable businesses to register when their 
turnover exceeds a certain threshold. 
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Businesses with turnover levels close to the 
threshold, however, may fail to register and 
they may evade both income tax and VAT. 
 Tax collected but not remitted. Registered 
businesses may charge VAT to their 
customers but then fail to pay the tax to the 
authorities, either by falsifying their 
accounting records, engineering their 
bankruptcy before the tax is paid, or by just 
disappearing. 
 False claims for credit or refunds. Invoices 
could be forged, thus purchases may be 
exaggerated to minimise the difference 
between the output and input VAT which has 
to be paid to the government. An intrinsic 
difficulty with VAT is the zero-rating of 
exports, which might encourage fraudulent 
claims to have exported commodities when in 
reality such exports may not occur, or the 
commodities have been sold in the domestic 
market. 
 VAT credit claimed for purchases that are not 
creditable. One of the examples of this 
scheme is the purchase of items for private 
consumption which are misrepresented as 
business inputs, in order to recover the VAT 
and reduce income tax liabilities. 
 Bogus traders. It is practically impossible for 
tax authorities to cross-check every invoice 
against evidence that the earlier tax has been 
paid. Exploiting this weakness, ‘invoice mill’ 
companies could be set up with the sole 
purpose of generating bogus invoices that 
allow the recovery of VAT. 
Studies have found that the invoice-and-
credit design of VAT may create a chain effect 
reaction when noncompliance is practiced in one 
of the stages of production or distribution. From 
a survey of small firms in Brazil, De Paula and 
Scheinkman (2010) examined the role of VAT in 
transmitting informality and noncompliance. 
They found that firms’ tax noncompliance is 
correlated to the informality of their suppliers or 
customers. Thus, when there is a high tolerance 
for the informality of firms in one production 
stage, tax noncompliance in the downstream and 
upstream stages would increase. This result 
confirms the impact of VAT in spreading tax 
noncompliance. 
Similarly, from field experiments in Chile, 
Pomeranz (2015) shows that VAT 
noncompliance behavior cascades through the 
production and distribution chains. Hence, 
Pomeranz (2015) argued that an optimal tax 
audit strategy would have to consider the 
multiplier effect through the audited firm’s 
trading network, rather than focusing solely on 
the deterrence effect on the audited firm. 
These studies show that maintaining and 
monitoring VAT may increase the compliance 
costs of the audited firms and the administrative 
costs of the tax agency. These costs may divert 
resources from more productive activities and 
represent a burden to the economy (Berhan & 
Jenkins, 2005). 
In summary, the argument for the self-
enforcing mechanism of VAT might need to be 
carefully scrutinized. Empirical studies (see 
Barbone et al. (2013); Keen and Smith (2006); 
Reckon (2009), for examples) found that many 
countries face the problem of VAT 
noncompliance. Hence, to get the most optimal 
gains from VAT, knowing the potential tax base 
and the level of noncompliance for the aggregate 
economy may be a good starting point. 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The VAT gap due to noncompliance is defined 
as the difference between the VAT Total 
Theoretical Liability (VTTL) and the actual 
VAT revenue. The methodology to calculating 
the VTTL follows Barbone et al. (2013). It is 
one of the ‘top-down’ approaches in which 
national accounts figures are used to arrive at an 
estimation of the VAT liability generated by 
different sub-aggregates of the economy. In the 
VAT system, final consumers pay the tax on 
their purchases of taxable goods and services, 
while producers pay the tax on the inputs 
consumed when producing non-taxable or 
exempt goods and services. Hence, there are two 
major components in VTTL: the VAT paid by 
final consumers and the VAT paid by producers. 
Thus, VTTL could be expressed as: 
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∑{𝑖: 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠}𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 . 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 +
 ∑{𝑗:𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠}𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑗  . 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗  (1) 
In the absence of complete data on all the 
individual purchases by consumers and 
producers, VAT Liability (VTL) is estimated 
using the national accounts aggregate. One of 
the main data sources is the World Input-Output 
Database (WIOD).1 WIOD provides aggregate 
data on the purchases of goods and services and 
classifies these data into consumption 
(intermediate and final), investment and exports. 
While exports are subject to zero-rating, 
consumption and investment purchases can 
generate a VAT liability. 
Regarding the source of data, another 
alternative would be to use Indonesia’s Input-
Output (IO) table, published by the Central 
Board of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS). 
Nevertheless, the problem is that Indonesia’s IO 
table only comes out at discreet intervals of 
about once every five years, hence a yearly 
examination would not be feasible. For this 
reason WIOD is used in this paper since it 
provides yearly data. 
VTTL is computed as the sum of three 
different components: VTL from final 
consumption, VTL from intermediate 
consumption with non-deductible VAT and VTL 
from investment. The VTL from final 
consumption is estimated as the sum of the 
values of the final consumption of goods and 
services, which WIOD separates into three 
categories: households, government and Non-
Profit Institutions Serving Households (NPISH). 
These consumptions are multiplied by the VAT 
rate to arrive at the VTL from final 
consumption.2 
The VTL from intermediate consumption is 
estimated as the sum of the values of 
intermediate consumption for each of the 36 
industries, as classified in WIOD, times the VAT 
rate times each industry’s proportion of non-
                                                          
1 http://www.wiod.org/new_site/database/niots.htm 
2 VAT rate in Indonesia stays unchanged at 10 percent for 
the period under study. 
deductible VAT or the “propex” factor (Reckon, 
2009). Since VAT exemptions vary over time, 
by examining the tax regulations on VAT 
exemptions over the study period, the propex for 
an industry in a particular year is set to one if all 
the goods or services produced by that industry 
are exempted in that year. If, in a particular year, 
no goods or services produced by a particular 
industry are exempted, the propex for that year is 
set to zero. The propex is estimated to be equal 
to the share of the exempt output in an industry’s 
total output, if only a portion of the goods or 
services produced by the industry are exempted. 
This estimation involves the assumption that the 
share of exempted goods or services in an 
industry’s output is equal to the proportion of 
inputs used by that industry to produce the 
exempt goods or services. 
The VTL from investment purchases 
consists of two components: Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (GFCF) and changes in inventories 
and valuables. The VTL is estimated as the sum 
of the values of investment purchases times the 
VAT rate times the propex factor. Neither data 
from WIOD nor from Indonesia’s Central Board 
of Statistics have any information on the values 
of investment purchases by each industry. In the 
absence of such data, the values of GFCF, as 
well as changes in inventories and valuables, are 
assigned from WIOD to each of its 39 categories 
(36 industries plus households, government and 
NPISH), based on the proportion of consumption 
of each category to the total consumption. This 
calculation involves the assumption that the 
share of capital expenditure is equal to the share 
of goods and services consumed. The propex 
factor for industries follows the calculations 
determined previously in estimating the VTL 
from intermediate consumptions. 
Since WIOD only contains data from 1995 
to 2011, the VTTL is estimated for 2012-2015 
by dividing each year’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) into each of the 39 different categories. 
The base for the allocation is the average share 
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of each category’s consumption to GDP during 
the years covered in WIOD, with the assumption 
that this ratio does not change over time. 
RESULTS 
Figure 2 shows the estimates of the VAT gap 
due to noncompliance in Indonesia, over the 
period 1995-2015. The gap widened 
significantly in the years following the Asian 
financial crisis of 1998, from around 9 percent of 
GDP in 1995 to around 11 percent in 1999. This 
was a period of turbulence. During and after the 
fall of the regime of Suharto in 1998, mass street 
protests, inter-ethnic unrest and increasing 
separatism occurred simultaneously. It might not 
be too difficult to envisage the problems faced 
by tax collectors in that kind of environment. As 
the threats of unrest eased – at the same time 
there was a tax reform launched in 2000 – 
Indonesia’s VAT gap started to decline and it 
reached its lowest level of around 6 percent of 
GDP in 2010. However, the gap has shown an 
increasing trend again since 2011, and reached 
around 8 percent of GDP in 2015 – even though 
there was another tax reform launched in 
2008/2009. 
The crisis adversely impacted the country’s 
fiscal conditions, among others. Thus, one of the 
approaches taken to improve the fiscal 
sustainability was reforming the tax system and 
the main point of the reform of 2000 was 
improvements in the tax administration. It can be 
argued that an emphasis on tax administration 
has its merits, because for developing countries 
making a formal distinction between their tax 
policy and tax administration may be pointless. 
This is due to the interdependent nature of these 
two domains – well designed tax policies can 
easily be undermined by poor administration. 
This does not negate the importance of good tax 
policies, since complex tax codes, schedules and 
procedures tend to increase the scope for 
avoidance and evasion. Nevertheless, the 
essence of a good tax policy – particularly for 
developing countries – is one which can be 
easily administered (Moore, 2013). This view is 
consistent with Casanegra de Jantscher (1990) 
who argued that in developing countries, ‘tax 
administration is tax policy’. 
 
 
Figure 2. VAT gap due to noncompliance as percentage of GDP 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (Various Years); Bank Indonesia (Various Years); World Development 
Indicators (Various Years); World Input-Output Database (WIOD) (2013); own calculations. 
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The tax reform of 2000 was deemed 
necessary due to the Indonesian tax authority’s 
(Directorate General of Taxes/DGT) many 
deficiencies in critical aspects, which resulted in 
high levels of noncompliance, foregone tax 
revenues and increases in the cost of doing 
business in the country. Moreover, the poor tax 
administration might pose as a fundamental 
barrier to effective and fair taxation, as well as 
hinder the efforts to build wider trust between 
the government and its citizens (Brondolo, 
Silvani, Le Borgne, & Bosch, 2008).  
The next reform, which occurred in 2008/ 
2009, was initiated to extend the initial reform of 
2000, with one of its goals being to improve the 
legal framework of tax administration. The 
stated purposes for the amendment of the tax 
laws were to provide fairer treatment, improve 
the delivery of service to taxpayers, improve 
certainty and enforcement, anticipate advances 
in information technology and changes in the tax 
regulations, improve the professionalism of the 
tax apparatus, enhance the tax administration’s 
openness and increase voluntary compliance 
(Indonesia, 2007). 
The increasing VAT gap since 2011, how-
ever, raised a question: might the reforms have 
failed in improving taxpayers’ compliance? 
Although several factors, such as the institu-
tional quality, economic growth and economic 
structure, matter for the levels of tax compliance 
in many countries (see, for example, in Agha 
and Haughton (1996); Christie and Holzner 
(2006); Sancak, Velloso, and Xing (2010)), the 
focus of attention in this paper is on how the 
implementation of tax administration reforms 
may affect taxpayers’ compliance. This is 
because the most important task of any tax 
administration is to facilitate compliance (Bird 
& Zolt, 2003), hence a viable long-term tax 
system depends on how effectively the tax 
administration carry out this task. Furthermore, 
as Bird (2004: 138) argued: “The problem of tax 
administration reform is essentially how to alter 
the outcomes of administrative effort by appro-
priate investment in developing new legal and 
organizational frameworks, adopting new 
technology (computerization), and altering the 
allocation of administrative resources.” Hence, 
examining how investment in these factors has 
been carried out may be useful in determining 
the proximate causes for the suboptimal results 
of Indonesia’s tax reforms, particularly in rela-
tion to increases in noncompliance since 2011. 
Prior to the reforms, several weaknesses in 
the tax administration were identified in the 
following areas: tax collection, the tax system, 
legal and governance frameworks, organizatio-
nal and staffing arrangements, enforcement and 
taxpayer service programs, and management 
information systems (Brondolo et al., 2008). 
Supported by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), reform initiatives were formulated and 
aimed at dealing with these factors. Hence, one 
of the ways to approach the question mentioned 
previously is by examining how these factors 
have been addressed. 
1.  Tax collection 
As government revenue from oil and gas 
exploitation continues to decline, tax revenues 
from the non-oil and gas sectors of the economy 
serve as one of the key elements in the effort to 
sustain the government’s budget. To achieve this 
goal, reform initiatives aimed at increasing the 
effectiveness of the enforcement efforts were 
formulated, which included identifying 
unregistered potential taxpayers, improving the 
performance of audits, improving the collection 
of tax arrears, as well as enforcing the filing of 
tax returns. It was expected that taxpayers’ 
compliance would also increase as a response to 
the increased enforcement efforts of the DGT. 
These initiatives produced positive results, at 
least until the reform of 2008/2009. The VAT 
gap due to noncompliance declined during the 
period 2000-2010. The annual average of the 
VAT gap in this period was 7.8 percent of GDP. 
It was a significant achievement compared to the 
gap during the previous period, 1995-1999, 
which reached an average of 9.7 percent of 
GDP. This decline in the VAT gap is consistent 
with increases in the tax ratio, i.e. the ratio of tax 
revenue to GDP. As shown in Figure 3, the tax 
ratio increased from 8.3 percent of GDP in 2000 
to 12.8 percent of GDP in 2008. Over the longer 
horizon, however, these reform measures seem 
to produce limited results. After the reform of 
2008/2009, a declining trend in the tax ratio can 
be observed, while at around the same time there 
is an increasing trend in noncompliance. 
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Figure 3. Tax Revenue as percentage of GDP 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (Various Years); Bank Indonesia (Various Years); World Development 
Indicators (Various Years); World Input-Output Database (WIOD) (2013); own calculations. 
 
These adverse results might be related to the 
fact that some of the implementations of the 
reform initiatives, aimed at improving the tax 
revenue, were not going as expected. For 
example, to achieve the targeted quantity of 
registered taxpayers, individuals with no income, 
such as housewives, were given taxpayer iden-
tity numbers – often without their knowledge. 
This practice increases the administrative costs 
for the DGT and may erode the public’s trust in 
the tax administration. Moreover, an initiative 
aimed at improving the quality of tax audits was 
hindered by the limited access to third-party 
data, particularly banking information. Still 
another example, the requirement that all VAT 
refund claims have to be audited makes the 
already limited number of auditors spend the 
majority of their time auditing refund claims, 
thus less time is dedicated to performing other 
audit programmes aimed at ensuring taxpayers’ 
compliance with the tax laws. 
2.  Tax system 
A complex tax system tends to make it difficult 
for ordinary citizens to calculate their liabilities 
exactly and, at some point, even to complete 
their tax returns. For businesses, a complex tax 
system could be so burdensome that it may 
distract them from their main objective, which is 
to earn profits. For many taxpayers, especially in 
low-middle income countries like Indonesia, 
hiring a tax consultant can be very expensive. 
Even when they can afford it, several specialist 
tax consultants may need to be hired for advice 
on complicated transactions. These compliance 
costs may eventually have to be borne by 
consumers in the form of higher prices. On the 
side of the tax administration, extra tax may 
have to be paid by taxpayers to cover any 
marginal costs incurred to administer the overly 
complex tax laws (Martin, 2005). 
On the other hand, there are several benefits 
of simpler taxes (Gale, 2001). First, they would 
reduce the burden – in terms of time, money and 
mental anguish – to be borne by taxpayers in 
complying with the tax laws. Second, simpler 
tax incentives are more likely to be used by 
taxpayers and thus would be more effective in 
achieving their intended goals. Third, simpler 
taxes may increase taxpayers’ compliance, as 
well as make enforcement easier. Fourth, in 
cases where the government needs to improve its 
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delivery of services by raising taxes, simpler and 
easier to understand additional taxes might be 
able to generate more public support. 
Nevertheless, simplifying Indonesia’s tax 
system does not seem to be an easy task. Even 
after two reforms (in 2000 and 2008/2009), a 
survey conducted by Deloitte (2014) found that 
respondents considered Indonesia to be one of 
the top three most complex tax regimes in the 
Asia Pacific region – the other two countries 
were the Chinese mainland and India. Moreover, 
regarding their future expectations for Indo-
nesia’s tax regime, the respondents predicted 
that the country would be the third most 
complex in the region in 2017. The respondents 
also believe that in the future they may have to 
spend more time and resources dealing with tax 
issues than they currently do, due to the 
increasing complexity of Indonesia’s tax regime. 
These results may indicate that the initiatives 
incorporated in the reforms of 2000 and 
2008/2009 – particularly those addressing the 
issue of complexity – have yet been completely 
implemented. 
3.  Legal and governance frameworks 
There were identified weaknesses in the legal 
framework of Indonesia’s tax administration. On 
one side, the tax authority lacked many powers 
common to modern tax agencies, such as a 
strong penalty regime, access to taxpayers’ 
records and key powers to collect tax arrears. On 
the other side, taxpayers lacked some basic 
protections, such as the easy processing of 
refunds, consistent tax assessments and unbiased 
treatment in the objection and appeal processes 
(Brondolo et al., 2008). Several reform initia-
tives were formulated to address these issues, 
such as increased penalties, a faster refund 
process for compliant taxpayers and course 
requirements for tax officers so that they can 
improve their services to taxpayers. 
Until the mid-2010s, however, these 
weaknesses have not been fully solved. The 
penalty regime has not been adjusted to match 
inflation, thus eroding its effectiveness as a 
deterrence tool and the tax authority’s access to 
banking records is still limited. Consistency in 
the tax regime was also problematic, as reported 
in the study by Deloitte (2014). The report 
defined consistency as “the perceived uniformity 
and transparency of enforcement of prevailing 
tax laws by the jurisdiction” (Deloitte, 2014: 11). 
In this aspect, the majority of respondents 
indicated the inconsistency of Indonesia’s tax 
regime. According to the report, this result could 
be attributed to three factors: tax legislation 
which changes frequently; the tax authority’s 
doctrine or publicly-available guidance, which is 
full of ambiguities, weaknesses and reversals; 
and tax disputes which take far too long to settle. 
An inconsistent tax authority is argued to be one 
that is also uncertain (Deloitte, 2014) and this 
condition could erode taxpayers’ confidence in 
the tax authority. 
This inconsistency may also adversely affect 
the performance of the DGT, because one of the 
factors which affects the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a tax administration is the 
stability of the tax structure over time. Frequent 
changes in tax legislation increase the 
complexity of a tax structure and could easily 
overload even the most sophisticated tax 
administration with impossible tasks (Hood, 
1976). Reflecting in part the often unstable 
political and economic environment, there is a 
tendency for developing countries to alter their 
tax legislation frequently. Such a concern is 
more important when frequent changes in tax 
legislation have burdened the tax administration 
with complex tasks in an often information-poor 
and generally hostile environment (Bird, 2004). 
Moreover, the survey by Deloitte (2014) 
found that arbitrary and biased tax assessments 
in Indonesia were still common, further eroding 
the taxpayers’ confidence in the ability of the tax 
administration to resolve disputes in a fair 
manner. This perception of unfairness might 
serve as a fundamental barrier to building wider 
trust between the citizens and government (IMF, 
2011). Further, as argued by Rothstein (2000), 
this lack of trust might negatively affect 
compliance. Rothstein (2000) maintained that 
when citizens do not believe that the tax 
authority would be honest and that the tax 
authority has the means to make sure that 
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(almost) all the other citizens paid their taxes, 
then it would be unlikely that citizens would pay 
their fair share of taxes. 
According to the slippery slope framework, 
one of the factors which affects compliance is 
the taxpayers’ trust in the tax authority (Kirchler, 
2007). Thus, mutual trust between the tax 
authority and taxpayers would lead to a 
synergistic tax climate where taxpayers are 
treated with courtesy and respect, since the tax 
authority trusts that taxpayers pay their taxes 
honestly. In return, the taxpayers would be 
willing to pay their fair share of taxes since they 
trust that the tax authority is benevolent and 
works beneficially for the common good 
(Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). Prior research, 
based on national and international surveys, 
found that tax compliance was positively related 
to trust in the tax authority (Torgler, 2003; 
Torgler & Schneider, 2005). Hence, it is possible 
that the incomplete measures for addressing 
weaknesses in the legal and governance 
frameworks may partially explain the increasing 
trend in noncompliance since 2011, as shown in 
Figure 2, through their adverse impact on 
taxpayers’ trust. 
4.  Organizational and staffing arrangements 
Prior to the reform of 2000 there were short-
comings in the DGT’s organizational structure. 
The field offices were organized into three 
separate, parallel networks of units: service 
offices (which administered income taxes and 
VAT), tax audit offices and property tax offices. 
Each office largely operated independently of 
each other, hence making the accountability of 
results difficult to attribute to specific units. 
Moreover, the organizational design of the 
headquarters was generally not effective for 
managing ongoing operations and engaging in 
continuous reforms. The inadequate number of 
staff was also identified as one of the factors 
contributing to the DGT’s poor performance in 
tax collection (Brondolo et al., 2008). 
Due to these weaknesses, changes in the 
organizational design were incorporated in the 
reforms of 2000 and 2008/2009. The field office 
is now re-organized to administer all type of 
taxes and functions (e.g. taxpayer services, 
audits, arrears collection) under one roof, thus 
facilitating the accountability of results. Field 
offices are separated and based on client groups: 
large, medium and small taxpayers’ offices. This 
arrangement was established to provide tighter 
control and specific services for the relevant 
groups of taxpayers. An account representative 
is assigned to each taxpayer, thus reducing the 
number of officials a taxpayer has to meet and 
thus minimising the chance of rent seeking 
behavior on the part of the tax officials. 
To strengthen the capability of the head-
quarters in managing ongoing operations and 
designing reform programs, a directorate was 
established with the responsibility for designing 
reform initiatives. The Directorate of Internal 
Affairs was also established to manage the 
ethical conduct and investigate law-breaking 
activities by tax officials. Further, the investiga-
tion of criminal violations of tax laws is 
managed under a dedicated criminal inves-
tigation unit. 
Nevertheless, since there are still perceived 
arbitrary and biased assessments by the tax 
authority and low confidence in its adminis-
trative procedures for resolving disputes 
(Deloitte, 2014), one of the most pressing issues 
would be to build the taxpayers’ trust in the 
dispute administration process. In Indonesia, 
taxpayer’s objections are administered by a unit 
under the DGT. The head of this unit is directly 
responsible to the Director General of the DGT. 
As such, the unit is not independent of the DGT 
and this organizational structure may create a 
conflict of interests, which might impede any 
fair and impartial treatment in resolving 
disputes. 
Regarding the staffing arrangements, it is 
common practice that tax authorities employ a 
large number of staff members to administer the 
national tax laws. Indeed, within the next few 
years the DGT plans to double its staff numbers 
and the increasing number of taxpayer was cited 
as one of the factors for this expansion (Araki & 
Claus, 2014). As one of the most populous 
countries in the world, the DGT has a relatively 
high ratio of labor force to tax officer, which 
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stood at 3,737 persons per officer compared to 
the neighboring countries, such as the 
Philippines (3,851), Thailand (2,004) and 
Malaysia (1,242)3. This ratio reflects roughly the 
number of registered taxpayers and potential 
(unregistered) taxpayers each tax officer is 
supposed to monitor. 
Nevertheless, this ratio may not satisfactorily 
explain the capability – or lack of it – of the tax 
authorities in collecting revenue. For example, 
even though Thailand has a much higher ratio of 
labor force per tax officer than Japan (1,172 
persons per tax officer) Thailand collected 
higher revenues (19.1 percent of GDP) than 
Japan (16.3 percent of GDP)4. 
Thus, in the aspect of its staffing arrange-
ments, it is not clear whether the number of staff 
employed at the DGT could explain the 
declining taxpayers’ compliance since 2011 in 
Indonesia. When compliance was at its highest 
level in 2010, the DGT employed 32,741 staff. 
In 2014 the number of staff swelled to 34,510 
while no improvement in compliance can be 
observed within this time frame (as shown in 
Figure 2).5 This implies that increases in the 
number of staff were not followed by increases 
in the taxpayers’ compliance.6 
Similarly, Bird (2004) argued that failure 
usually follows any tax reform strategy which 
requires substantial additional administrative 
resources – particularly staff. This is because the 
needed resources would not materialize fully, or 
in a timely fashion. Tax officers are civil 
servants, thus all the constraints affecting the 
civil services would also affect them. It is 
common, Bird (2004) argued, for tax authorities 
to experience difficulties in obtaining more staff, 
to have to raise wages to attract and retain staff 
with high qualifications, or even to acquire basic 
                                                          
3 Data for 2011 from Araki and Claus (2014) 
4 Data for 2011 from Araki and Claus (2014) 
5 Data on the number of staff members are from DGT’s 
Annual Reports. 
6 One of the possible explanations might relate to how 
DGT manage its human resources. Nevertheless, 
examinations of human resources managerial aspects is 
beyond the scope of this study, thus further research may 
be needed to shed some light on this issue. 
material needs such as computers and office 
space. 
Recently, the international trend in 
addressing this problem is to set up an 
independent revenue authority that, to some 
extent, has powers to hire and pay staff, as well 
as access to some earmarked source of revenue 
(Jenkins, 1994; Manasan, 2003). Nevertheless, 
experience with this organizational structure in 
developing countries has been mixed. In some 
countries (e.g. Peru and Mexico), improvements 
seemed to have occurred, particularly in the 
areas of corruption eradication and the delivery 
of taxpayer services (Taliercio, 2000). In other 
instances (e.g. Peru), however, matters seemed 
to go well at first, following the creation of an 
independent revenue authority, but then they 
worsened rapidly; while in others (e.g. 
Tanzania), it seemed that there was no tangible 
impact which could be observed (Bird, 2004). 
Although beyond the scope of this paper, a 
tentative conclusion could be drawn: 
establishing an independent revenue authority 
may not be the panacea for poor tax 
administration. Countries that lack the will, 
strategy and resources for their efforts to reform 
their tax administrations are unlikely to be 
successful, even if they create independent 
revenue authorities. On the other hand, countries 
that have these critical ingredients probably do 
not need to create such an authority (Bird, 2010). 
5.   Enforcement and taxpayer service 
programs 
The DGT’s weaknesses in its audit and arrears 
collection functions hampered the efforts to 
enforce taxpayers’ compliance. This lack of 
enforcement resulted in a narrow taxpayer base 
and widespread underreporting of tax liabilities. 
Services and assistance provided to taxpayers 
were severely limited, due to poor personnel 
management, inadequate training and the lack of 
a service-oriented attitude (Brondolo et al., 
2008). 
Hence, reform initiatives were directed 
towards addressing these issues. Improvements 
in audit programs were formulated to strengthen 
the capability for identifying unreported and 
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underreported income and sales. Several 
improvements were notable. A new audit 
management system was installed to monitor 
nationwide audit processes. There were targets 
for the quantity and types of audit set for each 
auditor and field office. Further, simplified audit 
procedures were established for refunds claimed 
by compliant taxpayers with certain criteria. This 
way, audit resources can be focused more on 
auditing the less compliant. 
Amid these improvements, however, the 
survey by Deloitte (2014) found a lack of 
fairness in the conduct of tax audits. The 
majority of respondents in the survey perceived 
that the Indonesian tax administration lacks 
respect, professionalism and proper business 
conduct when doing audits. This finding may 
imply that the reforms of 2000 and 2008/2009 
have not been able to create a synergistic climate 
where the tax authority and taxpayer work 
together towards a common goal. In this climate, 
the tax authority holds the view that it performs 
a service for the community and that it is, itself, 
an integral part of the same community the 
taxpayer belongs to. Thus, transparent proce-
dures, as well as respectful and supportive 
treatment of the taxpayer are the aims of the tax 
authority. The perception of unfairness in the 
conduct of tax audits, as shown in the survey by 
Deloitte (2014) might indicate that the reform 
has not yet been successful in changing the 
attitude of officials towards taxpayers. As the 
audit function holds a significant role in the self-
assessment system and serves as a pillar of the 
tax administration (Araki & Claus, 2014), 
weaknesses in this area may adversely affect the 
capability of the DGT to collect revenue and, 
more importantly, to facilitate and enforce 
compliance. 
6.  Management information system 
After the reforms, a new information system was 
installed, which had the purpose of supporting 
the DGT’s service and enforcement 
programmes. It was initially designed to provide 
a single system for monitoring taxpayers’ 
activities and be able to reduce the need for face-
to-face contact between taxpayers and tax 
officers, thus limiting the opportunities for rent-
seeking behavior by the tax officers, improving 
the compliance and increasing revenue. 
Establishing a single management infor-
mation system, however, does not seem to be an 
easy undertaking for the DGT. Over time, there 
have been expansions in the number of 
information systems tax officers have to use. In 
2015 tax officers had to run at least six systems 
to control compliance and report their daily 
activities. Some of these systems are not able to 
communicate with each other, due to different 
programming languages. This may increase 
administrative complexity and the costs of 
monitoring taxpayer compliance. 
Bird (2004: 139) argued that the ideal 
information system for tax administration should 
include, among other things, a subsystem that is 
able to assess the capacity of the tax base in the 
economy. Without it, a tax authority would not 
have the necessary tool to ascertain its existing 
and potential tax bases, as well as to formulate 
the appropriate policies to narrow the gap 
between the two. In this respect, it may be 
essential for Indonesia’s tax authority to 
establish an information subsystem that can 
collect economic data and analyze them, in order 
to have better information on, for example, the 
revenue consequences of tax reform proposals, 
the impact of proposed tax changes on income 
distribution and equity, as well as a better ability 
to estimate future tax revenues. All of this would 
lead to a tax system which is better designed and 
administered (Bird & Zolt, 2008). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has reviewed Indonesian tax reforms 
post-Asian financial crisis, with emphasis given 
to reviewing the reform efforts aimed at 
improving the capacity of the tax administration. 
Although the institutional environment in which 
a tax system operates may affect the taxpayers’ 
compliance behavior, how taxes are 
administered may also hold an important role in 
altering this behavior – either in a positive or 
negative direction.  
Closer examination suggests that the 
taxpayers’ compliance will improve when the 
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majority of the tax reform initiatives are properly 
implemented. On the contrary, compliance 
would deteriorate if the reform process suffered 
from decelerations, setbacks and reversals. Such 
incomplete reform might erode the taxpayers’ 
trust in the tax authority in particular, and the 
government in general (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, 
& Torgler, 2010; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & 
Torgler, 2008). If this condition emerges, the 
scope to raise extra government revenues would 
be limited. This would be a source of great 
concern when there are budgetary pressures due 
to the rising demand for public expenditure. 
Tax reform is a continuous process. 
Improved compliance with the tax laws does not 
come by itself. It has to be created, cultivated, 
monitored and enforced at all times (Bird, 2004). 
In this regard, there are several approaches 
which could be considered in an effort to 
improve compliance. First, looking back at the 
reform initiatives contained in the reforms of 
2000 and 2008/2009 might be advantageous. 
Identifying which initiatives have been 
implemented successfully and which have not, 
or even those not yet carried out, might be a 
good start in the effort to halt the deterioration in 
compliance and reverse its trend.  
Second, getting advice and technical 
assistance from international agencies might be 
helpful. Sustaining tax reforms over time 
requires that a country’s tax authority holds the 
ownership of the reform process. Nevertheless, 
international agencies could provide valuable 
advice and expertise in the design and 
implementation of reform programmes. 
Improved compliance in 2000-2010 happened 
when the tax reforms were under the guidance of 
international agencies, while deteriorations in 
compliance since 2011 took place at the same 
time as the advisory role of these agencies was 
reduced. 
Third, the tax gap may need to be estimated 
and monitored systematically and continuously. 
These tax gap estimates could provide a broad 
view of citizens’ compliance with the tax laws. 
If it is done on a systematic and continuous 
basis, the tax authority would be able to assess 
taxpayers’ compliance behavior over time, 
analyze its proximate causes and formulate 
appropriate policies in a timely manner. 
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Appendix A 
VAT Theoretical Liability (VTL), 1995-2015 (million US$) 
 
Sources:  Badan Pusat Statistik (Various Years); Bank Indonesia (Various Years); World 
Development Indicators (Various Years); World Input-Output Database (WIOD) (2013); 
own calculations. 
 
 
Year
 
VTL from 
Household 
Consumption
VTL from 
Government & 
NPISH 
Consumption
VTL from 
Intermediate 
Consumption by 
Industries  
1995  16,111                 1,881                  7,539                     
1996  18,558                 2,066                  8,924                     
1997  18,198                 1,852                  9,346                     
1998  7,876                   608                      3,874                     
1999  12,467                 1,023                  6,048                     
2000  12,362                 1,211                  6,429                     
2001  11,873                 1,271                  5,635                     
2002  14,896                 1,614                  6,796                     
2003  17,751                 2,139                  8,092                     
2004  18,489                 2,328                  8,395                     
2005  19,880                 2,531                  9,135                     
2006  25,637                 3,564                  12,235                   
2007  30,842                 4,092                  14,382                   
2008  35,764                 4,992                  17,095                   
2009  36,519                 5,981                  18,347                   
2010  46,688                 7,479                  24,146                   
2011  54,432                 8,991                  29,671                   
2012  68,326                 8,173                  31,794                   
2013  67,775                 8,107                  31,613                   
2014  66,142                 7,912                  30,879                   
2015  64,121                 7,670                  29,787                   
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Appendix B 
 
VAT Gap, 1995-2015 
 
Sources:  Badan Pusat Statistik (Various Years); Bank Indonesia (Various Years); World 
Development Indicators (Various Years); World Input-Output Database (WIOD) (2013); 
own calculations. 
Notice: The Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business and its Board of Editors 
are not responsible for any errors or flaws found in this article. The authors 
take full responsibility for their work. 
Year
 
VAT Total 
Theoretical 
Liability 
(Million US$)
 
Actual VAT 
Collection 
(Million US$)
 
VAT Gap 
(Million US$)
 
GDP 
(Million US$)
 
VAT Gap as 
Percentage of 
GDP (%)
 
1995  25,531                7,407                   18,124              202,132            8.97  
1996  29,549                9,302                   20,247              227,370            8.90  
1997  29,396                8,456                   20,940              215,749            9.71  
1998  12,358                2,890                   9,468                 95,445              9.92  
1999  19,538                4,213                   15,325              140,001            10.95  
2000  20,002                3,743                   16,259              165,021            9.85  
2001  18,779                5,442                   13,337              160,447            8.31  
2002  23,306                7,282                   16,024              195,661            8.19  
2003  27,982                8,845                   19,137              234,772            8.15  
2004  29,212                9,700                   19,512              256,837            7.60  
2005  31,546                10,579                 20,967              285,869            7.33  
2006  41,436                14,507                 26,929              364,571            7.39  
2007  49,316                16,635                 32,681              432,217            7.56  
2008  57,851                20,153                 37,698              510,229            7.39  
2009  60,848                19,546                 41,302              539,580            7.65  
2010  78,313                28,927                 49,386              755,094            6.54  
2011  93,094                34,028                 59,066              892,969            6.61  
2012  108,293              35,964                 72,328              917,870            7.88  
2013  107,496              36,775                 70,721              912,524            7.75  
2014  104,933              40,082                 64,851              890,815            7.28  
2015  101,579              31,645                 69,934              861,256            8.12  
